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EXTENDING OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
TO THIEVES
Adam R. Nelson*
This Note addresses the important question of whether all thieves can be
held liable for violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5. Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has cautiously
expanded liability for trading on material nonpublic information from
corporate insiders only, to tippees, to outsiders standing in a fiduciary
relationship to the source of the confidential information. Recently, the
Second Circuit held in SEC v. Dorozhko that a thief who owed no duty to
the source of misappropriated information could be held liable if he
accomplished his theft by means of affirmative misrepresentation. This
decision represents the next step in increasing liability for outsider trading.
This Note contends that holding all thieves liable, even those who do not
obtain information by means of affirmative misrepresentation, constitutes a
logical expansion of liability consistent with section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and
case law. The traditional requirement of a fiduciary relationship between
the misappropriator and the source of the information in outsider trading
cases results in under-inclusive doctrine that fails to fully satisfy the
purpose of the Exchange Act. Expanding liability to include all thieves is
sound policy that will better protect investors and the integrity of the
market.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 13, 2011, Raj Rajaratnam, the billionaire co-founder of the
Galleon Group hedge fund, was sentenced to eleven years in prison for
violating federal insider trading laws. 1 At Rajaratnam’s sentencing, Judge
Richard Holwell commented, “Insider trading is an assault on the free
markets,” and that Rajaratnam’s crimes “reflect a virus in our business
culture that needs to be eradicated.” 2 Prosecutors accused Rajaratnam of
exploiting a network of well-placed friends and business contacts to gain
confidential information relating to earnings reports and takeover activities
at a number of major companies, including Google, Hilton, and Intel.3
These tippers included a former managing director of McKinsey &
Company, Rajat Gupta, 4 and a senior vice president at IBM, Robert
Moffat. 5 In total, the government has brought charges against twenty-nine
defendants in enforcement actions related to the Galleon investigation.6
The prosecution of Rajaratnam and the other members of his web of
tippers indicates the seriousness with which the government pursues insider
trading allegations and the stiff penalties imposed on those who are caught

1. Susan Pulliam & Chad Bray, Trader Draws Record Sentence: Rajaratnam Slapped
with 11-Year Prison Term for Orchestrating Insider Scheme, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2011, at
A1.
2. Peter Lattman, Galleon Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnamis-sentenced-to-11-years/.
3. See Litigation Release No. 21,284, SEC, SEC Charges 13 Additional Individuals and
Entities in Galleon Insider Trading Case (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2009/lr21284.htm.
4. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011). The
complaint against Gupta alleged that he shared with Rajaratnam information obtained in the
course of his duties as director of Goldman Sachs and Proctor & Gamble. Id.
5. See James Bandler, Dangerous Liaisons at IBM: How a Star Executive’s Love
Affair Ensnared Him in the Biggest Hedge Fund Insider-Trading Ring Ever, FORTUNE, July
26, 2010, at 66, 68; Caroline Winter et al., The Great Hedge Fund Takedown, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 14–20, 2011, at 79, 80.
6. See Litigation Release No. 22,140, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against
Rajat Gupta, Brings New Charges Against Raj Rajaratnam (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22140.htm.
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engaging in the practice.7 For the first time in an insider trading
investigation, the government used wiretaps to record conversations during
which Rajaratnam and others shared information.8 The eleven-year
sentence Rajaratnam received, though less than the maximum twenty-four
years’ imprisonment the prosecution sought, represents the longest-ever
sentence for insider trading. 9 In addition, the district court judge presiding
over the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) case ordered
Rajaratnam to pay a $92.8 million penalty, the largest ever imposed in a
SEC insider trading case. 10 Combining the penalty with fines and
forfeitures imposed at the time of his sentencing, Rajaratnam will pay a
total of $156.6 million.11
The sentencing of Rajaratnam was an important moment in a recent push
by federal prosecutors to pursue insider trading prosecutions aggressively.
In the two-year period leading up to Rajaratnam’s conviction, Preet
Bharara, the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
brought charges against fifty-four individuals for insider trading crimes.12
Of those, fifty have been convicted at trial or have pled guilty, while the
matters of three others remain pending, and one is a fugitive. 13
A recent study published by the Wall Street Journal indicates that
sentences for insider trading have become longer and that those sentenced
are more likely to spend time in prison than they had been previously. 14 In
the past two years, 79 percent of those sentenced for insider trading
violations in New York federal courts have been sent to prison, compared
with 59 percent in the 2000s, and less than half of those sentenced from
1993 to 1999. 15 Additionally, in the past two years, the median sentence
for defendants sent to prison for insider trading violations has risen to 2.5
years, up from 18 months in the previous decade and 11.5 months from
1993 to 1999. 16
7. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589,
1625 (1999) (noting that because insider trading is difficult to detect in many instances and
the rewards for insider trading are potentially significant, the penalties must be stiff in order
to provide an effective deterrent to the conduct).
8. See Susan Pulliam, Galleon Sinks, Informant Surfaces, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at
A1.
9. Pulliam & Bray, supra note 1. Prior to Rajaratnam’s sentencing, the longest
sentence for insider trading had been imposed on Zvi Goffer, another participant in the
Galleon trading scandal. Id.
10. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Civ. 8811, 2011 WL 5374112, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
8, 2011); Peter Lattman, Rajaratnam Is Ordered to Pay $92.8 Million Penalty in Trading
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at B3.
11. See Lattman, supra note 10.
12. Peter Lattman, 11 Years in Jail for Fund Chief in Stock Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2011, at A1.
13. Id.
14. See Chad Bray & Rob Barry, Long Jail Terms on Rise, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2011,
at C1.
15. See id.
16. Id.
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Despite the high-profile media and prosecutorial attention insider trading
cases enjoy, the limits of liability for insider trading and even its doctrinal
underpinnings remain uncertain.17 Individuals such as Rajaratnam are
liable under current insider trading law when they receive improper tips
from company insiders, even if they are outsiders to the company about
which they receive confidential information and in whose securities they
trade. 18 On the other hand, it is unclear under current doctrine whether an
individual who does not receive a tip, but who steals confidential
information from a company to which she is an outsider in order to use the
information to make a securities trade, is liable for unlawful insider
trading. 19 This is a worrisome gap in securities laws that can be exploited
by a number of thieves. 20
This Note addresses this important issue. Part I examines the
background and development of insider trading liability. It reviews the
purpose behind the initial prohibition against insider trading as well as the
subsequent evolution of insider and outsider trading doctrine through
judicial decisions. Part II examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s
acceptance of the misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan,21
which expanded liability for trading on material nonpublic information to
outsiders. Finally, Part III argues that holding all thieves liable for trading
on stolen material nonpublic information is consistent with Supreme Court
case law and constitutes sound public policy.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INSIDER
AND OUTSIDER TRADING
This section provides a brief summary of the theoretical underpinning of
the prohibition against insider trading, a review of the statutes prohibiting
the practice, and the cases through which the doctrine developed. Part I.A
provides an overview of the statutory provisions and SEC rules that prohibit
trading on material nonpublic information. Part I.B discusses the
scholarship supporting the prohibition against insider and outsider trading
and the arguments that support a free market approach to confidential
information. Part I.C concludes with a review of the major cases through
which the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading liability
developed.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part I.C.1.d.
19. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 900–01 (2010).
20. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of
the Den of Thieves: A Conceptual Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O’Hagan, 33
TULSA L.J. 163, 174 (1997) (noting that thieves, industrial spies, and nonfiduciaries may not
be liable under Supreme Court precedent). Cyber-theft of financial assets and sensitive
information by company insiders and outsiders has become common, and can be difficult to
detect and prevent. See SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 (Oct. 13, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
21. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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A. Statutory Background
The Securities Exchange Act of 193422 provides the statutory authority
for the federal prohibition against insider trading. 23 This section examines
Congress’s purpose in passing the Act and the two sections of the Act under
which insider trading violations are prosecuted.
1. The Underlying Purpose Behind the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Act provides the statutory authority for the modern prohibition
against insider trading. 24 The Act was one of many pieces of legislation
passed by Congress in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 to
regulate securities and securities markets in the United States.25 The Act
regulates securities, their issuers, buyers, and sellers, as well as the
securities marketplace, including exchanges. 26
Members of Congress during the New Deal recognized the need to
restore public confidence in investment securities, and passed the Act with
the intention of giving the SEC broad authority to regulate in the public
interest. 27 The Act’s stated purpose was “to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets.” 28 Congress’s underlying policy concerns in passing
the Act were the protection of investors and the integrity of the market.29
To achieve the broad purposes intended by Congress, the Act “assure[s]
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or

22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006).
23. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 23 (2d ed. 2007).
Professor Bainbridge notes that prior to the enactment of federal securities laws, state law
had governed insider trading cases, and though the federal laws have largely preempted state
laws, cases are still occasionally brought under state law, and plaintiffs still sometimes
include state laws claims along with federal insider trading claims. See id. at 7–8, 15.
24. Id. at 23.
25. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 329, 329–30 (1988). In addition to the Act, after the stock market crash of 1929,
Congress also passed the Securities Act of 1933, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act
of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to regulate securities. The purpose of New Deal financial
regulations has been described as a project to “[m]ak[e] capitalism live up to its
pretensions.” MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (1970).
Congress created the SEC in 1934, granting it the authority to administer regulations related
to the securities laws. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (6th ed.
2009).
26. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 20.
27. See PARRISH, supra note 25, at 3, 228; Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 461 (1990) (noting that
contemporaries of the Act considered it to fundamentally change the relationship between
the public and the market).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
29. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United
States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 175 (1998) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92
(1975) (Conf. Rep.)).
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advantages among investors.” 30 Accordingly, it “addresses virtually all
aspects of securities transactions and the securities markets generally.” 31
Prior to passage of the Act, Congress held hearings to examine stock
exchange practices during the period leading up to the stock market crash.32
The Senate authorized the Committee on Banking and Currency to hold
hearings on the practice of buying and selling stocks.33 The testimony drew
the Committee’s attention to the practice of insider trading. 34 In its report,
the Committee identified directors and officers breaching their fiduciary
duties to aid their market transactions, as well as large shareholders
profiting by accessing and using inside information, as “[a]mong the most
vicious practices” uncovered by their investigation.35 As the SEC and the
Supreme Court would both later note, “A significant purpose of the
Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for
personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.” 36
2. Statutory Provisions Prohibiting Insider Trading
a. Section 16(b)
Congress acted to address the issue of insider trading in section 16 of the
Act. 37 Section 16(b) of the Act permits shareholders to sue officers,
directors, or shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the company’s
stock to recover any short-swing profits gained by the purchase and sale, or
sale and purchase, of any equity security in the company occurring within
six months of each other. 38 The stated purpose of section 16(b) is to
“prevent[] the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer.” 39 When reviewing transactions for a violation of 16(b), the
majority of courts interpret the transactions so as to maximize shareholders
recovery. 40

30. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 94-229, at 91).
31. HAZEN, supra note 25, at 309.
32. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 25, at 338–39.
33. 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at Item 21 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
34. Id. at 55.
35. Id.
36. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
SEC 907, 912 n.15 (1961)).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006).
38. Id. § 78p(a)–(b).
39. Id. § 78p(b).
40. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 184 (stating that courts interpret section 16(b) to
maximize the recovery by companies); HAZEN, supra note 25, at 538–39 (noting that many
courts take a “broad view” of what constitutes profit under section 16(b)).
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Section 16(b) provides a limited prohibition against insider trading.41
The benefit of section 16(b) is that it clearly defines the conduct prohibited
and the penalty for violation.42 However, the statute prohibits only a
limited range of conduct by insiders.43 The statute is therefore both overinclusive and under-inclusive. 44 It may result in liability for an insider who
commits a technical violation of the statute without abusing inside
information, while allowing an insider to use confidential information but
avoid liability by timing her transactions to skirt the letter of the statute.45
Despite these limitations, for thirty years after its passage, federal courts
addressed insider trading only through section 16(b). 46
b. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Section 16(b) is no longer the lone provision that prohibits insider
trading. 47 Many insider trading cases are now brought under section
10(b) 48 of the Act and Rule 10b-5 49 promulgated thereunder. 50 Section
10(b) of the Act is a general prohibition against fraud or misrepresentation
in securities transactions. 51 Under section 10(b), Congress granted
authority to the SEC to promulgate rules “as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.” 52
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under the rulemaking
authority granted to it under section 10(b). 53 The Rule was originally
enacted to fill a gap created by the Act’s prohibition of fraud in the sale of
securities, but not their purchase. 54 It has since become a principal weapon
used to fight securities fraud. 55 The purpose behind Rule 10b-5 is to protect
investors from being deceived into purchasing or selling securities.56

41. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 535 (noting that Congress considered section 16(b) to
be a “crude . . . objective” method of preventing the use of information in a situation with a
great potential for abuse).
42. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 182–83.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. HAZEN, supra note 25, at 535–36.
46. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 162.
47. See David M. Brodsky & David J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 45 (1998) (noting that “section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 have become the primary provisions for prosecuting insider trading”).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
50. See Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 47, at 45.
51. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). The development of insider trading doctrine under section 10(b)
is covered in greater detail in Part I.C., infra.
53. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 27.
54. See, e.g., Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: Rule 10b5-2(b)(1),
Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1469, 1473 (2010).
55. Id.
56. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442.
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Rule 10b-5 contains three specific provisions related to the purchase or
sale of a security. The first provision, 10b-5(a), bans the use of “any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” 57 Section 10b-5(b), the second
provision, prohibits material misstatements and omissions. 58 Finally, the
third provision, Section 10b-5(c), proscribes “any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 59
These three provisions create a broad and adaptable prohibition against
securities fraud consistent with the flexible antifraud provision of section
10(b) of the Act. 60 Taken together, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “not
intended as a specification of particular acts or practices that constitute
fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices
by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.” 61
B. Economic Arguments Regarding the Prohibition Against Trading
on Material Nonpublic Information
Commentators have disagreed on whether insider trading harms
investors, and have debated the desirability of the prohibition against
insider trading. 62 Though the debate is unlikely to result in a significant
change in securities regulation, and less likely still to lead to a repeal of the
ban on insider trading, 63 the lack of scholarly consensus suggests one
reason why courts have proceeded cautiously in developing insider trading
jurisprudence. 64
Part I.B.1 reviews the arguments made by scholars who support the
prohibition against insider trading in order to address the fundamental
question of whether the prohibition serves to make markets more efficient
and fairer to traders. Part I.B.2 then considers arguments made by scholars
who support a free market approach to insider information. Finally, Part
I.B.3 concludes by reviewing a recent argument that regulation of outsider
trading, such as trading based on inside information stolen by a corporate
outsider, is better justified than the prohibition against trading by insiders.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2011).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
60. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 29–30; HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442 (describing
Rule 10b-5 as the SEC’s “most encompassing antifraud prohibition”).
61. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961). In keeping with the broad
purpose of the Act, courts have interpreted the Act “flexibly rather than with narrow
technicality.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
62. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
63. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1620 (arguing, in response to the suggestion that federal
insider trading law be repealed and regulatory jurisdiction be returned to state common law,
that because of the way the law of insider trading has developed it would be “too costly” to
make a fundamental change of this kind).
64. See infra Part I.C.
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1. Arguments Supporting the Insider Trading Prohibition
Scholars have developed a number of arguments in support of the
prohibition against insider trading. This section reviews four of these
arguments. The first two arguments discuss how insider trading reduces
market efficiency. 65 The third involves the potentially negative effect that
insider trading would have on management of publicly traded companies
with dispersed shareholders. 66 The fourth relates to what supporters of the
prohibition believe is a weakness in the free market approach. 67
First, scholars contend that insider trading reduces investor confidence
and thereby harms the markets. 68 Congress’s purpose in passing the
securities laws was primarily to promote the integrity of the stock markets
and the public’s confidence in the markets. 69 This purpose was generally
moral and political in nature rather than purely economic; the efficient
pricing of securities was only a secondary purpose. 70
However, an economic argument for the benefit of promoting investor
confidence exists as well—namely, that insider trading increases transaction
costs. 71 Supporters of the prohibition have argued that “[i]nvestors are
reluctant to play in what they perceive to be a rigged game.” 72 To the
extent that investors are willing to invest in markets that they perceive to be
rigged, they will demand compensation in the form of discounting the
securities at the time of purchase. 73 The prohibition against insider trading
increases confidence among the investing public, which in turn promotes
liquidity and investment and reduces the discounting demanded by
investors because of perceived unfairness. 74
Second, supporters of the prohibition argue that the ban makes markets
more efficient because it protects the incentives for market analysts to
Permitting insider trading would reduce
perform their function. 75
incentives for market analysts to conduct research because they would not
be able to learn all of the information on which trading in the market
occurs. 76 The prohibition against insider trading therefore promotes the
efficiency of markets by protecting those who gain their informational
65. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110–12 (1998).
66. See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
“Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 655–59.
67. Id. at 657–58.
68. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 110–12.
69. See supra Part I.A.1.
70. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 111–12.
71. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1998).
72. Id. at 49.
73. Id. (noting that outsiders will discount shares because they will not be able to
determine whether the public share price is accurate, but will know that they will
systematically lose out to inside traders).
74. See id.
75. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 110–12.
76. Id.
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insights by diligence and whose efforts are integral to the informational
efficiency of the stock markets. 77 One criticism of this market efficiency
argument, however, is that it underestimates the chilling effect on
research. 78 By discouraging the use of information that has not been
previously disclosed, a ban on insider trading reduces the incentive to create
such information. 79
Third, supporters of the prohibition contend that permitting insider
trading by managers is not in the interest of public corporations that have a
large number of passive owners, primarily, public shareholders.80 Such
owners will not expend their own resources to monitor and constrain
managerial misbehavior because they can free ride on the efforts of others
and gain the same benefits.81 Under a system that permits insider trading,
management would control the information related to insider trading and
shareholders would lack an effective way to monitor whether the tradeoff
between the benefits and costs of insider trading by management was in
In a system of such informational asymmetry,
their interests. 82
shareholders would rationally prefer unqualified openness in their
managers’ compensation arrangement. 83 The prohibition against insider
trading stands in for the terms to which shareholders and management
would agree should a negotiation be possible.84 One supporter of the
prohibition has argued that permitting insider trading as a form of
compensation would harm shareholders; it would lead managers to select
projects that are riskier than shareholders would prefer, because managers
would capture a share of any gain while leaving shareholders to bear any
loss. 85
Finally, supporters argue that because the prohibition is the status quo,
those who advocate a free market approach carry the burden of persuading
that the prohibition should be rescinded.86 Critics of the ban have deployed
empirical data in support of a free market system with respect to
confidential information, or have argued that no data exists to support the
prohibition. 87 Supporters counter that empirical data on the topic is scant,

77. Pritchard, supra note 71, at 51.
78. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 353, 355 (1988).
79. See id.
80. Cox, supra note 66, at 655–56.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 657.
83. Id. at 657–58.
84. Id. In situations in which enforcement is difficult or the costs of enforcing private
property rights are high, the state often deploys its regulatory power as a substitute for
granting property rights. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1626.
85. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332.
86. See Cox, supra note 66, at 657–58.
87. See id. at 643–44. But see Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual
Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174–77 (2005) (arguing that,
because business people did not complain about insider trading before its prohibition, they
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most likely because the topic of insider trading does not lend itself to
empirical study, and the conditions to test management in a free market do
not exist because of the prohibition.88 Thus, supporters insist, the critics’
argument that no empirical data supports the prohibition is unpersuasive
and does not justify a radical change to the existing regulatory scheme. 89
2. Arguments in Favor of Permitting Insider Trading
The work of Professor Henry Manne has animated the arguments against
the insider trading ban. 90 Manne questioned the premise of the prohibition,
asserting that insider trading did no harm to long-term traders, and
criticized the lack of analytical rigor on the part of the ban’s supporters.91
He also advanced two primary arguments in favor of permitting insider
trading.
First, Manne argued that insider trading produces the benefit of moving
stock prices closer to the price at which the stock would be valued if all
information, including inside information, were known to the market.92
Inside traders will begin trading on the nonpublic information after gaining
access to it. Uninformed traders following the price change of the stock—
or who become informed of the confidential information by means of
leakage of the information or tipping—will gain insight and trade as well.93
The result of these trades is to move the share price gradually toward the
price that incorporates the confidential information, rather than for the share
to experience a sharp price change that would be expected to occur upon
disclosure of significant confidential information to the trading public.94
The pricing rationale articulated by Manne has been criticized as
inefficient 95 and, with respect to the investor who trades with the informed

did not see a problem with the practice and may well have considered it to have beneficial
effects).
88. See Cox, supra note 66, at 644–45 (noting that because insider trading relies on
secrecy, researchers will always lack observable data on which to base their studies).
89. See id. at 645.
90. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 133–35.
91. MANNE, supra note 90, at 10. Manne has argued that long-term investors, defined as
those who trade to rebalance diversified portfolios in changed circumstances or who alter
weightings in an already balanced portfolio, would face little harm whereas short-term
traders who treat the stock market as a “gambling casino” would frequently lose out as a
result of insider trading. See Manne, supra note 87, at 169 & nn.7–8.
92. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 78–104. Critics of the prohibition against insider
trading generally subscribe to the efficient capital markets hypothesis. See Thomas Lee
Hazen, Commentary, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 987, 993 (1987).
93. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 144–45.
94. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 80–83, 86–90.
95. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 144. Movement of prices due to release of
information by insider trading has been criticized as slow and, in some instances in which
noise trading is sufficiently high, the release of information may fail to move prices at all.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 629–34 (1984).
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trader, a poor substitute for disclosure. 96 Indeed, the type of information
likely to move stock prices is often the type that will require prompt
disclosure. 97
Second, Manne argued that permission to use inside information could be
a beneficial and appropriate form of compensation for entrepreneurs
working at large corporations. 98 He argued that neither salary nor bonuses
were appropriate forms of compensation for an entrepreneur because, while
the value of the entrepreneur to the firm is in creating new information, it is
rarely possible to value such information in advance. 99 However, an
increase in stock price serves as a reasonably accurate measure of the value
of the new information to the firm, and the entrepreneur can recover the
invention’s value by purchasing the shares in advance of the announcement
of the invention. 100
This model has been criticized on a number of grounds. The value
recovered by the entrepreneur may not be accurate in that it is limited by the
resources with which she can purchase shares. 101 Moreover, it is difficult
to limit trading only to the entrepreneur and only to situations in which she
produces valuable information, rather than bad news that will reduce share
price. 102 Finally, it is difficult to design compensation packages properly,
given the contingent nature of insider trading. 103
3. Differential Treatment of Insider and Outsider Trading
Professors Ian Ayres and Stephen Choi advanced a different approach to
analyzing trading based on informational advantages. 104 The authors
contended that the arguments in favor of banning outsider trading are
stronger than the arguments in favor of banning insider trading. 105 This is
because the informed outsider fails to internalize the full impact of her
trading. 106 The authors agreed with Professor Manne that a firm would be
able to “internalize many of the costs and benefits from trades based on
inside information on the part of its managers.”107 By means of a
contractual relationship allowing managers to trade on insider information,
the firm is able to reduce compensation while providing management with

96. Cox, supra note 66, at 646.
97. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 692 (3d ed. 2009).
98. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 131–45.
99. See id. at 134–36.
100. See id. at 138–41.
101. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 146.
102. See id. (noting that an inside trader who can profit from a company’s loss will be
more tolerant of bad news).
103. See id. at 147.
104. See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 313 (2002).
105. Id. at 321.
106. Id. at 320.
107. Id. at 337–38.
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an incentive to maximize profits. 108 Loss to shareholders resulting from
managers’ insider trading will result in shareholders demanding a discount
at the time the company sells its shares to the public. 109 To the extent that
managers adjust firm decisions in order to engage in insider trading and
these adjustments result in an increased expected cost to shareholders,
investors will demand a discount at the time they purchase shares.110 Thus,
the authors concluded that a firm that allows insider trading can largely
internalize the costs.111
In contrast, Ayres and Choi argued that the informed outsider fails to
internalize the social impact of trading and therefore should not be
permitted to trade on material nonpublic information.112 The outside trader
only internalizes the direct cost of obtaining the trading information and the
benefits from the use of that information in trading, but ignores the value of
increased price accuracy or the costs to the uninformed trader with whom
the outside trader conducts the transaction.113 The authors stated that
although “outsider trading without the consent of the traded firm can
increase or decrease social welfare. . . . as an empirical matter . . . external
costs are likely to be more prevalent than external benefits.” 114 Ayres and
Choi argued that it is difficult for regulators to determine ex ante which
instances of informed outside trading are socially beneficial and which are
detrimental. As a result, the misappropriation theory 115 essentially fails in
making such a determination because of its blanket prohibition against
certain types of outside information advantages.116 They suggested instead
that firms are better placed than regulators to make such a determination
and should be permitted to do so.117
The misappropriation theory has addressed outsider trading by certain
outsiders. 118 Ayres and Choi made a strong argument that it would be
desirable to expand regulation of outsider trading beyond current limits
because of the special concerns that relate to outsider trading. 119
4. Summary of Economic Arguments
As described in the brief summary above, the extensive scholarship
examining the economic rationale for the prohibition against insider trading

108. Id. at 338–39.
109. Id. at 340.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 341.
112. Id. at 320.
113. Id. at 320–21, 343 (noting that the value of the increase in the accuracy of the price
depends on whether and when the information would have become known in the public
capital markets without the actions of the outside trader).
114. Id. at 343.
115. See infra Part II.
116. See Ayres & Choi, supra note 104, at 354.
117. See id. at 354–55.
118. See infra Part II.A.
119. See Ayres & Choi, supra note 104, at 404–08.
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has failed to produce a clear consensus either for its prohibition or for
changing the regulatory landscape by removing the prohibition. The
scholarly commentary also has failed to settle the debate as to whether the
prohibition against insider trading succeeds in accomplishing the Act’s
purpose of ensuring the integrity of markets (or whether a different
regulatory scheme, or no scheme at all) would be more effective. 120 Given
the uncertainty of the theory underpinning the prohibition, it is unsurprising
that courts have acted carefully in developing the doctrine of the prohibition
against insider trading.
C. Evolution of Insider Trading Doctrine via Judicial Decisions
Neither the text of section 10(b) nor the text of Rule 10b-5 mentions
insider or outsider trading. 121 As noted above, the scholarly debate
surrounding the prohibition against insider and outsider trading has also
failed to provide clear support for the theoretical underpinnings of the
prohibition. The initial question, therefore, is whether insider or outsider
trading constitutes fraud or deceit prohibited under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 122 In the absence of explicit direction from Congress, and with
encouragement from the SEC, courts have developed insider and outsider
trading doctrine via judicial decisions.123 Through a series of cases, courts
have used the general anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
to develop the modern prohibition against insider and outsider trading that
extends beyond the limited prohibition described in 16(b).
Courts recognize two theories of liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 for trading on material nonpublic information. The first is the
classical theory of insider trading. The second, not accepted by the
120. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
122. See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 576 (2008).
123. Because of the complexity of the jurisprudence and the stiff penalties assigned to
those found liable for insider trading, many commentators have encouraged congressional
action to provide greater clarity to the prohibition. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 19, at 913–
14; Krawiec, supra note 20, at 175. Congress has in the past considered legislation to
provide a firm definition of insider trading, but in each instance chose not to take action. See
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1315, 1366–68 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Insider Trading]. Recently, however,
Congress passed legislation to clarify that insider trading by congressional insiders is
prohibited. See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/insider-trading-banfor-lawmakers-clears-congress.html. Increased congressional support for the Stop Trading
on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act was prompted by an exposé on the television
program 60 Minutes. See Carl Hulse, A Change in Attitude About Dubious Stock Dealings,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2011, at A17. The STOCK Act was originally proposed in 2006 but
found little support, and had been criticized for failing to reach certain behavior. See Donna
M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1105, 1130–37 (2011) (noting that the STOCK Act failed to reach certain hypothetical
situations, and failed to deal with obstacles that the SEC would face in investigating
members of Congress and staffers).
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Supreme Court until 1997, is the misappropriation theory. The remainder
of Part I discusses the major cases by which these theories have developed
before reviewing two recent enforcement actions by the SEC that test the
limits of currently accepted doctrine.
1. Classical Theory
a. In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
The classical theory of insider trading liability was first articulated in the
SEC proceeding In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 124 During a break in a meeting
of the directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, J. Cheever Cowdin, a
Curtiss-Wright director, called Robert M. Gintel, one of his partners in the
brokerage firm Cady, Roberts & Co., and told him that the board of CurtissWright had decided to approve a dividend cut.125 Before the cut was
announced publicly, Gintel sold shares from customer accounts, thereby
avoiding substantial losses when the Curtiss-Wright share price dropped
significantly. 126
In holding Gintel liable for violating Rule 10b-5, Chairman William Cary
articulated the “disclose or abstain” standard of insider trading liability.127
An insider of a company must disclose material information known to her
by virtue of her position with the company but not known to her trading
partner if knowledge of such information would affect the investment
decision of the trading partner. 128 Failure by the insider to disclose the
material information in such a situation constitutes fraud.129 If disclosure
of the material information is not possible or unrealistic under the
circumstances, then the insider must abstain from making the
transaction. 130 In Cady, Roberts, the board’s decision to reduce the
dividend constituted material information and, because of his relationship to
Curtiss-Wright as one of its directors, Cowdin was not permitted to trade on
that information without disclosure. 131 The prohibition extended to Gintel
as well, since he was a partner of Cady, Roberts & Co. with Cowdin. 132
b. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Because Cady, Roberts was an SEC administrative decision, and
therefore did not constitute binding precedent for the federal courts, there
was some question how the courts would treat the duty to disclose or
124. 40 SEC 907 (1961).
125. Id. at 909.
126. Id. at 909–10.
127. Id. at 911.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 912.
132. Id. The case was also one of first impression in that the trades in question occurred
over an impersonal exchange rather than face-to-face. Id. at 907.
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abstain. 133 However, the Second Circuit took up the issue of insider trading
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 several years later, in the case
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 134 On November 12, 1963, a team of
employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS) took geological core samples
from a location near Timmons, Ontario that revealed significant copper,
zinc, and silver content. 135 Because of the significance of the initial
sample, TGS was convinced of the benefit of acquiring the entirety of the
geological segment from which the sample was removed. 136 To facilitate
the acquisition, the president of TGS ordered the members of the team that
took the sample to keep the results of the sample confidential, even from
other TGS officers, directors, and employees. 137
In March and April of 1964, TGS engaged in further drilling at the site
and confirmed a significant mineralogical discovery. 138 Meanwhile, the
company denied rumors and reports that it had made a major find, going so
far as to run a report in general circulation newspapers on April 13, 1964
giving a misleading statement on the find at Timmons. 139 Shortly
thereafter, the company made an official announcement of the find on April
16, 1964, after a journalist who visited the site prepared to publish an article
describing a major find at Timmons. 140
During the period between the extraction of the initial sample and the
announcement of the find, certain TGS insiders bought TGS shares and
options in TGS stock and tipped outsiders as to the significant discovery
made at Timmons. 141 Two defendants bought TGS shares in the period
between the April 13 press report and the official announcement of the
discovery on April 16. 142 Also, in February 1964, TGS issued stock
options to twenty-six officers and employees, four of whom were aware of
the detailed results of the core sample and another of whom was aware of
the discovery of a positive sample. 143 Because of confidentiality concerns,
neither the TGS Stock Option Committee nor the Board of Directors had
been informed of the discovery, and the insiders with knowledge of the find
accepted the options without disclosing their knowledge. 144
On review, the Second Circuit endorsed the disclose or abstain theory,
holding that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied to the insiders’ trading
activity. 145 The court cited Cady, Roberts for the proposition that one who
has access to information intended solely for a corporate purpose, and not
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 42.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845–46.
Id. at 846–47.
Id. at 844, 847.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 847–48.
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for the personal benefit of anyone, may not use the information if she
knows it is unavailable to the person with whom she trades. 146 The Second
Circuit noted that the prohibition was not limited to insiders, but that
“anyone” in possession of material nonpublic information must “disclose it
to the investing public, or, if she is disabled from disclosing it . . . or she
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”147
In this case, TGS’s legitimate corporate purpose of maintaining the
confidentiality of the find at Timmons did not excuse the insiders’
disclosure requirement; consequently, their trading without disclosure was
not permissible. 148
The Second Circuit stated that the disclose or abstain theory “is based in
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information,” 149 known as “parity of information.” 150 In the
court’s view, simple possession was sufficient to trigger the disclose or
abstain rule, because the requirement extends to “anyone” who has access
to information “directly or indirectly.” 151
Thus, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court endorsed a broad theory of insider
trading liability based on the disclose or abstain theory, extending it to
anyone in possession of material nonpublic information.
c. Chiarella v. United States
When the Supreme Court subsequently addressed insider trading in
Chiarella v. United States, 152 it did not endorse the same broad liability that
the Second Circuit had adopted in Texas Gulf Sulphur. 153 Vincent F.
Chiarella was a markup man for Pandick Press, a financial printer that
produced announcements of takeover bids.154 To preserve confidentiality,
when Pandick received bid announcements, they contained blanks or false
names in the place of the names of the companies involved in the
transaction. 155 The real names of the participating companies were not
given to Pandick until shortly before the documents were to be printed.156
Despite this precaution, in five instances Chiarella was able to identify the
companies involved in the transactions using other information contained in

146. Id. at 848 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
153. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 44 (noting that the insider trading holding of the
case, based on the parity of access theory, is no longer good law).
154. Id. at 224.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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the redacted documents.157 And despite company policy and clear
warnings against doing so, Chiarella traded on this information, making
over $30,000 in fourteen months.158 He was convicted at trial of seventeen
counts of violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 159 The Second Circuit
affirmed. 160
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella’s convictions.161 Chiarella was
convicted under the theory that he had remained silent and willfully failed
to inform sellers of the securities he purchased that he had information
regarding planned takeover bids that would increase the value of the
companies’ shares. 162 In reversing, the Court held that one who does not
disclose material information prior to engaging in a securities transaction
commits fraud only when she has a duty to disclose that information, and a
duty to disclose arises only when there is “a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence” between the two parties. 163 Because no
relationship existed between Chiarella and the sellers that gave rise to a
duty to disclose, the Court overturned his conviction.164
The Court refused to hold that a general duty to forego trading on
material nonpublic information exists between all market participants, i.e.,
that mere possession of material nonpublic information gives rise to a duty
to disclose or abstain. 165 The Court thereby rejected the parity of
information theory on which the Second Circuit had based its holding in
Texas Gulf Sulphur and, in doing so, narrowed the scope of liability for
insider trading. 166
Chiarella included concurring opinions by Justices John Paul Stevens
and William J. Brennan. Justice Stevens’s concurrence emphasized that the
Court did not reach the live question of whether Chiarella breached a duty
of silence owed to his employer and its customers, which would have
Justice Brennan’s
resulted in an actionable Rule 10b-5 claim. 167
concurrence suggested that if the jury had been instructed on section 10(b)
liability arising from Chiarella’s improperly obtaining and converting
nonpublic information used for trading (as opposed to the mere failure to
disclose), the result may have been different, but the jury was not instructed
that misappropriation was an element of the offense.168 In Justice
Brennan’s view, a violation of section 10(b) occurs “whenever [a person]
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 224, 245.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 234–35.
See Krawiec, supra note 20, at 169.
Chiarella, 445 U.S at 237–38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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which she then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.” 169
In addition, Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun
authored vigorous dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Burger interpreted
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to require that “a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that
information or to refrain from trading.” 170 Under Justice Burger’s reading,
the statute and rule do not limit liability to corporate insiders who make
deceptive use of corporate information, but apply more broadly to any
instance in which an individual accrues informational advantages by
unlawful means. 171 In his view, Chiarella should have been held liable
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he stole nonpublic information
entrusted to him in confidence, regardless of his relationship to any other
party. 172
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, criticized the
Court’s imposition of limitations that unduly narrowed the scope of section
10(b). 173 In Justice Blackmun’s view, the majority did not justify by
statutory text or legislative history the requirement that a fiduciary or
similar relationship is required to give rise to a duty to disclose or
abstain. 174 The purpose of the Act, he asserted, is to ensure fairness in the
markets broadly, not to follow the law of fiduciary duty. 175 Justice
Blackmun therefore focused on the importance of the insider gaining access
to confidential information that an honest investor would not be able to
obtain. 176 He would have imposed a prohibition against trading by persons
who have access to confidential material information not lawfully available
to others. 177
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella indicate
dissatisfaction with the limitations of the classical theory as adopted by the
Court. The four concurring and dissenting opinions criticized the theory of
liability accepted by the majority as unduly narrow, or expressed
willingness to consider a broader theory of liability in the event that such an
alternative theory was presented to the Court. Nevertheless, in Chiarella,
the Court affirmed the classical theory of insider trading that locates the
prohibition within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Failure to disclose or
abstain by one with a duty to speak constitutes fraud, and fraud falls within
the statutory and regulatory prohibition. 178

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246–47.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 251.
Steinbuch, supra note 122, at 576.
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d. Dirks v. SEC
The next major case in the development of the classical theory of insider
trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was Dirks v. SEC. 179
Raymond L. Dirks, an officer of a New York broker-dealer, received
confidential information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity
Funding of America (Equity), that the assets of Equity were significantly
overstated due to fraudulent practices.180 Secrist passed the information to
Dirks so that Dirks could verify and disclose the fraud. 181 Neither Dirks
nor his firm owned Equity stock. 182 After satisfying himself that the fraud
allegations were true, but before disclosing the fraud, Dirks openly
discussed the fraud with a number of clients and investors, some of whom
sold their Equity securities.183
The question on review by the Supreme Court was whether Dirks could
be held liable for insider trading as a “tippee” under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. The Court held that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to
shareholders not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
tipper has breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders by sharing the
information with the tippee, and the tippee knows or should know that the
tipper has committed a breach.184 The tippee’s liability is therefore
derivative of the tipper’s.185 Because the securities laws seek to eliminate
the use of material nonpublic information for personal gain, the breach of
the duty owed to shareholders occurs when the insider-tipper directly or
indirectly profits from the disclosure.186 Therefore, the Court held that
Dirks was not liable because neither Secrist nor the other Equity employees
violated a duty to shareholders by profiting from disclosing the fraud to
Dirks. 187
As in Chiarella, Justice Blackmun authored a dissent, which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, criticizing the majority for unduly limiting
the scope of protection afforded by the securities laws. 188 By creating the
subjective limitation on breach by tying it to the insider’s gain, the majority
permitted Secrist to disseminate information to Dirks’s clients who sold
Equity’s securities, and thereby harm the purchasers to whom Secrist had a
duty to disclose. 189 The dissent argued that the improper purpose
requirement was without basis in law. 190

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 666–67.
Id. at 667–79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 676.
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Dirks confirmed that when a corporate outsider receives an improper tip
from an insider, the outsider might be held liable for insider trading. 191
Though liability depends on the breach by the insider, the decision
nevertheless represented an important increase in the scope of insider
trading liability. 192
e. Summary of the Classical Theory of Insider Trading
The Court’s adoption of the classical theory of insider trading liability
under section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 holds that an insider commits
fraud unless she discloses material nonpublic information on which she
trades or abstains from trading. 193 This duty extends to outsiders who
receive tips of material nonpublic information from insiders if the insiders
benefit from the disclosure to the tippee.194 Despite consistent criticism by
a minority of the Court, the classical theory does not impose a general duty
upon all market participants in possession of information, as originally
articulated by Chairman Cary in Cady, Roberts, but only upon those with a
fiduciary duty to shareholders and their tippees. 195
2. The Misappropriation Theory
The origin of the misappropriation theory is commonly traced to Chief
Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion in Chiarella. 196 At that time, the Court
had reserved judgment with respect to misappropriation because the theory
was not presented. 197 Nevertheless, in his dissent, Chief Justice Burger had
emphasized that a person who misappropriates confidential information has
a duty to disclose. 198 Implicit in this view is the notion that liability can
extend beyond insiders to a much broader group of outsiders. After
Chiarella, the SEC worked to persuade the lower courts to accept the
misappropriation theory based on the opening in that decision. 199

191. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
192. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 54–57.
193. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 164, 186 and accompanying text.
196. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 99; supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
199. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 99–100. A circuit split developed with respect to
acceptance of the misappropriation theory. The Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
accepted the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991);
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.
1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). The Fourth and Eighth
Circuits rejected the theory. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996),
rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
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a. Carpenter v. United States
The first Supreme Court case to address the misappropriation theory was
Carpenter v. United States. 200 R. Foster Winans, the author of the popular
“Heard on the Street” column in the Wall Street Journal, breached a duty of
confidentiality to his employer by sharing the contents of the column with
fellow conspirators before its publication. 201 Under company policy, the
contents of the column were not to be released before publication and, if
they were, Winans was to disclose the release to the Journal. 202 Because
the content of the column was known to affect the price of the featured
stocks, the conspirators were able to profit by examining the information
contained in forthcoming columns and buying or selling stocks in
anticipation of the column’s effect. 203
In its decision, the Court emphasized that Winans had deprived the
Journal of its property right in its confidential business information—
namely, the contents and timing of the column. 204 Therefore, the Journal
was the victim of Winans’s fraud, although it neither bought nor sold
stocks. 205 The scheme satisfied the requirement that it be “in connection
with” the purchase or sale of a security because the sole purpose of the
scheme was to profit by using the advance information contained in the
column. 206 Nevertheless, a divided Court affirmed Winans’s conviction
4-4, 207 and thus did not create binding precedent. 208
b. United States v. O’Hagan
The Supreme Court first accepted the misappropriation theory in United
States v. O’Hagan. 209 James O’Hagan was a partner at the law firm Dorsey
& Whitney. 210 O’Hagan learned that his firm had been retained as local
counsel to represent Grand Metropolitan in connection with a potential
tender offer for Pillsbury’s stock. 211 O’Hagan purchased a number of call
200. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
201. Id. at 23.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 25–26.
205. Id. at 24.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. A decision by an evenly divided Court serves to affirm the lower court’s decision but
does not create precedent. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 (1868).
209. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
210. Id. at 647. The charges brought against O’Hagan shocked the Minneapolis business
community, in which O’Hagan was an “acknowledged star,” responsible for defending
important local institutions such as the Mayo Clinic. See Eben Shapiro, A Leading Lawyer’s
Fall Is a Jolt to Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A33. However, O’Hagan was
caught misusing client funds and prosecutors believed that he engaged in the trades at least
in part to repay the funds. David Phelps, High Court to Decide O’Hagan Case, STAR TRIB.,
Apr. 14, 1997, at D1.
211. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
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options for Pillsbury stock, and 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock, at
$39 per share. 212 When Grand Metropolitan announced its tender offer, the
stock value increased to nearly $60 per share. 213 O’Hagan sold his options
and shares, realizing a profit of more than $4.3 million.214
In its decision, the Court adopted the misappropriation theory, holding
that O’Hagan’s actions satisfied section 10(b)’s requirement of a “deceptive
device or contrivance” used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of
securities. 215 Rather than premising liability on a fiduciary relationship
between the company insider and shareholders with whom he trades, as in a
case of insider trading under the classical theory, the Court premised
O’Hagan’s liability on his relationship to his firm, which had entrusted him
with the confidential information. 216 The Court stated that O’Hagan owed
a “duty of trust and confidence” to his firm and to its client, which he
breached by trading on nonpublic information regarding the planned tender
offer. 217
In the Court’s view, O’Hagan committed the deception essential to a
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he feigned loyalty to his
firm and its client while secretly converting the confidential information for
his own gain. 218 In so doing, O’Hagan defrauded the source of the
information. 219 The Court noted that O’Hagan would not have been liable
under the misappropriation theory had he disclosed his intention to trade on
the nonpublic information to his firm. 220
The Court determined that O’Hagan’s actions also satisfied the
requirement that they be “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.” 221 The Court held that the fraud was consummated not when the
O’Hagan acquired the information, but when he used the information to
trade without first making a disclosure to his firm. 222 Because material
nonpublic information of the type at issue in O’Hagan is “ordinarily” used
for the purpose of making securities trades, misappropriation of the
information was sufficiently related to the subsequent securities transaction
to satisfy section 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement. 223
The Court emphasized that the misappropriation theory is consistent with
the purpose of the Act to ensure honest markets and promote investor
confidence. 224 The Court expressed the view that permitting unchecked use
212. Id. at 647–48.
213. Id. at 648.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 653.
216. Id. at 652.
217. Id. at 653.
218. Id. at 653–54.
219. Id. at 654–55.
220. Id. at 655. The Court noted that even after disclosure, the trader could be liable in
some instances under state law for breach of the duty of loyalty. Id.
221. Id. at 655–56.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 656–58.
224. Id. at 658.
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of misappropriated information would permit certain individuals to gain an
informational advantage that other parties could not overcome through
research, and would cause investors to either refuse to participate in the
market, or discount securities. 225
c. SEC v. Zandford
In SEC v. Zandford, 226 the Court reversed dismissal of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 charges against Charles Zandford, a securities broker who made
trades using a client’s account and, on twenty-five separate occasions,
transferred the proceeds of the trades into his own account. 227 Zandford
argued that the securities sales were lawful and the subsequent thefts of the
proceeds, though fraudulent, were not “in connection with” the sale.228 He
contended that the theft was analogous to simple theft of cash or
securities. 229
The Supreme Court held that Zandford had engaged in a single scheme to
defraud his client and each sale of securities was made to further that
scheme. 230 In reaching its decision, the Court noted Congress’s purpose in
passing the Act to ensure honest markets and protect investors, and
emphasized the tradition of construing the securities laws flexibly. 231 In
addition, the Court granted deference to the SEC’s broad interpretation of
the “in connection with” requirement, which the Court considered
reasonable. 232
3. Recent SEC Enforcement Actions
The Court’s acceptance of the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan
expanded the scope of individuals who could be held liable for violating the
prohibition against insider trading. Recently, the SEC has brought actions
against investors who misappropriated confidential information but did not
stand in any relationship to the source of the information, as O’Hagan had
to his firm and its client.233 The individuals in the cases highlighted below
were strangers to the companies about which they gained material
nonpublic information and in whose securities they traded; nevertheless, the
SEC brought enforcement actions against each of them. 234

225. Id. at 658–59.
226. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
227. Id. at 815–16.
228. Id. at 820.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 820–21.
231. Id. at 819.
232. Id. at 819–20.
233. See Lisa Rachlin, Recent Developments in the Duty Requirement Under the
Misappropriation Theory: A Critique of Cuban’s Unintended Consequences, 11 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 67, 79–81 (2010).
234. See id.
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a. SEC v. Stummer
In SEC v. Stummer, 235 the SEC charged Michael A. Stummer with
insider trading in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 236 Stummer
snuck into his brother-in-law’s home office, gained access to his computer
by guessing his password, then gained access to the network of the private
equity firm at which his brother-in-law was employed. 237 He read
confidential emails that indicated a planned transaction and then traded
using that information.238
Stummer consented to an entry of judgment without admitting or denying
the SEC allegations and agreed to disgorgement of illegal profits and
interest, as well as a civil penalty. 239 As a result of the consent agreement,
the case was not tried, 240 but is nevertheless noteworthy because Stummer
bore no fiduciary relationship to his brother-in-law or to the companies
involved in the transaction or their shareholders.241 Yet the SEC was
willing to bring section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 charges against him and
succeeded in obtaining a favorable settlement. 242
b. SEC v. Dorozhko
In SEC v. Dorozhko, 243 the SEC brought charges against a computer
hacker who accessed confidential information.244 In October 2007,
Oleksandr Dorozhko, a resident and national of the Ukraine, opened an
online trading account with Interactive Brokers and deposited $42,500 into
the account. 245 Also during October 2007, IMS Health, Inc. announced that
it would release its third quarter earnings report during a conference call
with analysts after the market closed on October 17.246 IMS hired
Thomsen Financial, Inc. to provide web-hosting services, including the
online release of the earnings report.247 Throughout the day on October 17,
a hacker repeatedly attempted to gain access to the IMS earnings report on
the Thomsen server, eventually succeeding in locating and downloading the
report at 2:15 PM, shortly after it was uploaded to the server.248

235. Litigation Release No. 20,529, SEC, SEC Files Settled Illegal Trading Charges
Against Day Trader who Traded on Information He Fraudulently Obtained from His
Brother-in-Law (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20529.htm.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See Rachlin, supra note 233, at 80–81.
242. See id.; see also Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1343.
243. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
244. See id.
245. Id. at 44.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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Though the IP address of the hacker was known, it had not been traced at
the time the SEC sought a preliminary injunction from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 249 Nevertheless, substantial
circumstantial evidence indicated Dorozhko’s involvement with the
hacking. Shortly after the hacker downloaded the report from the Thomsen
server, Dorozhko purchased $41,670.90 worth of put options using his
online trading account.250 Later that afternoon, IMS announced that its
quarterly earnings were 28 percent below expectations.251 The next
morning, IMS shares fell approximately 28 percent almost immediately
upon the opening of trading. 252 Within minutes of the market opening,
Dorozhko sold all his IMS options, realizing a profit of $286,456.59.253
After learning about the irregular trading activity from Interactive
Brokers, the SEC sought a preliminary injunction in the district court to
freeze the proceeds of Dorozhko’s sale of his put options. 254 The district
court denied the motion on the ground that the SEC was unlikely to succeed
on the merits of its section 10(b) claim. 255 The court rejected the SEC’s
arguments that the hack was “theft by deception” and therefore “deceptive”
within the term’s meaning under section 10(b). 256 The court reviewed
Chiarella and O’Hagan, and determined that in both cases, liability for
insider trading was premised on a fiduciary or similar duty to disclose or
abstain. 257
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying
the preliminary injunction.258 In reaching its decision, the court rejected the
district court’s reading of the relevant Supreme Court precedent that
“deceptive” requires the breach of a fiduciary duty in all cases.259 The
court engaged in its own reading of Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford and
concluded that the cases “all stand for the proposition that nondisclosure in
breach of a fiduciary duty satisfies §10(b)’s requirement . . . [of] a deceptive
device or contrivance.” 260 However, the SEC’s theory was not that
Dorozhko remained silent when he had a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading, but rather that he affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to
gain access to the nonpublic information he used to make his trades.261 The
court refused to extend the fiduciary duty requirement to the
misappropriation context, writing that “what is sufficient is not always what
249. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated by SEC v.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
250. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
255. See id. at 343.
256. Id. at 329–30.
257. See id. at 330.
258. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.
259. See id. at 48.
260. Id. at 49.
261. See id.
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is necessary, and none of the Supreme Court opinions considered by the
District Court require a fiduciary relationship as an element of an
actionable securities claim under Section 10(b).”262 The court adopted the
interpretation of Chiarella and its progeny proposed by the SEC, namely
that “misrepresentations are fraudulent, but . . . silence is fraudulent only if
there is a duty to disclose.” 263
After distinguishing this case based on the theory of liability, the court
then had to determine the definition of “deceptive” that applied in cases
where the theory of liability is affirmative misrepresentation. The court
held that Dorozhko could be found liable if his conduct was deceptive
according to the ordinary meaning of the word. 264 The court defined
“deceptive” broadly by relying on a dictionary definition rather than
choosing a limited definition that would “complicate the enforcement of
Section 10(b).” 265 The court remanded the case to the district court for
determination of whether the hacker gained access to the file by
misrepresenting his identity or by exploiting computer code, i.e., whether
the hack was deceptive or not. 266
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
FOR OUTSIDER TRADING DOCTRINE
The Court’s acceptance of the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan
marked an important expansion of liability for trading on material
nonpublic information to corporate outsiders. Part II reviews the
implications of the O’Hagan decision and the Court’s acceptance of the
misappropriation theory for outsider trading doctrine. Part II.A assesses the
impact of the decision in expanding liability to a broader group of outsiders
who had not previously been liable under classical insider trading doctrine.
Parts II.B and II.C discuss scholarly criticism of the O’Hagan decision and
address doctrinal tensions resulting from the decision. Next, Part II.D
examines how courts and the SEC have treated the fiduciary requirement
after O’Hagan. Finally, Part II.E asks whether holding persons who steal
confidential information and trade using that information liable under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is a justified progression of insider trading
doctrine after O’Hagan.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 50.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 49.
266. See id. at 51. Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the attorney for
Dorozhko lost contact with his client. See Insider Trading: Enforcers Turn Corner on
Insider Trading by Hedge Funds, Say Current, Ex-SEC Staff, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 42, at 519 (Mar. 22, 2010). The SEC subsequently brought a motion for summary
judgment, which the attorney for Dorozhko did not oppose. Id. The motion was granted by
the district court on March 24, 2010. Litigation Release No. 21,465, SEC, SEC Obtains
Summary Judgment Against Computer Hacker for Insider Trading (Mar. 29, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21465.htm. Because the case was concluded
by summary judgment, the district court did not have the opportunity to address the
important questions raised by the Second Circuit in its decision.
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A. Expansion of Liability to Outsiders
Whether a corporate outsider who did not improperly receive a tip from a
corporate insider was forbidden from trading on material nonpublic
information had been an open question prior to the O’Hagan decision. 267
In decisions prior to O’Hagan, the Court had only directly addressed the
liability of company insiders and those whom they improperly tipped for
violating the insider trading prohibition.268 By definition, such individuals
were few in number and relatively easy to identify because of their special
relationship to the company. 269 In the context of insider trading liability,
the fiduciary requirement provided a logical, bright-line boundary for
defendants who could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 270
Insiders’ duty not to trade was understood to be connected with their role in
the corporation and their concomitant fiduciary duty. 271 The prohibition
against their trading was plainly consistent with the legislative history of the
Act, and with the purpose of preventing insiders from using confidential
information for personal gain.272
In O’Hagan, the Court explicitly stated that the misappropriation theory
complemented the classical theory, and was intended to target outsiders
without a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the company in whose securities
they traded. 273 These outsiders represented a group who had not previously
faced liability. 274 By holding O’Hagan liable for violating section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Court confirmed that a broader and more diverse group
of corporate outsiders could be held liable for insider trading. 275
B. Criticism of O’Hagan
O’Hagan presented an easy fact pattern in the sense that O’Hagan had a
fiduciary duty to his firm as a partner, and violation of a fiduciary duty was
an accepted ground for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under earlier
classical theory insider trading cases.276 As a result, the SEC focused on
the fiduciary relationship as the basis of O’Hagan’s liability. 277 Professor
Donna Nagy has argued that misappropriation is a broad and flexible
doctrine and by considering only the fiduciary theory of liability, the
O’Hagan decision left unexplored other theories, thereby potentially
leaving undefined the full extent of insider trading liability. 278

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 155.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See Hazen, supra note 19, at 890–91.
See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1335–36.
See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336; supra Parts I.A.1, I.C.1.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997).
See id.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336.
See id.
See id.
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The O’Hagan decision received criticism on a number of grounds.279
Most relevant to the question of whether thieves can be liable under the
misappropriation theory is criticism related to the decision’s requirement of
a fiduciary duty owed by the misappropriator to the source of the
information. 280 The Court’s description of O’Hagan’s duty to his firm was
criticized both for failing (1) to articulate clearly the relationship between
the fiduciary duty requirement and the harm caused by misappropriation,
and (2) to provide clear guidance as to which outsiders could face liability
for outsider trading. 281
1.

The O’Hagan Decision Did Not Fully Analyze
the Fiduciary Relationship

The O’Hagan decision has been criticized for its failure to provide a full
and satisfactory analysis of the fiduciary duty underlying O’Hagan’s
liability for misappropriating information from his firm. Scholars have
noted that the Court appeared to limit the relationship to a fiduciary one,
rather than a relationship of “trust and confidence” used elsewhere, but
these scholars have expressed uncertainty with respect to whether the Court
intended to establish a new, more limited standard. 282 Professor Kimberly
Krawiec has noted that although the Court refers repeatedly to a “fiduciary
relationship,” it failed to define the term. 283 The decision left unclear
whether the fiduciary duty that the Court conceived as underpinning the
misappropriation theory comes from state or federal law. 284 To the extent
the Court addressed the characteristics of the fiduciary duty, it merely
emphasized the traditional qualities of the duty: trust, loyalty, and
confidentiality. 285
The O’Hagan Court recognized a safe harbor provision for a fiduciary
who discloses to the source of the information her intent to trade.286 This
provision of the case has been criticized as indicative of the Court’s

279. See Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the
Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 867 (2003) (noting that the decision was criticized for
“misconstruing the relevant statute; misreading the Supreme Court’s own precedents;
lacking a coherent doctrinal basis for prohibiting insider trading; leaving too many
unanswered questions; creating illogical loopholes in the regulatory scheme; and extending
the reach of federal securities laws too far”).
280. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339–40.
281. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1634.
282. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 176–77.
283. Krawiec, supra note 20, at 174.
284. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 176, 206 (noting that federal courts will have to
develop their own common law if the Court intended a federal law of fiduciary duty to
apply—and if state law fiduciary principles govern, then different results could occur in
different states in instances of similar fact patterns).
285. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339.
286. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).
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inconsistent application of the fiduciary requirement. 287 Such a provision
does not make sense as a matter of fiduciary law, but the Court deemed the
carve-out necessary because it treated O’Hagan’s silence to his firm as the
deceptive conduct that brought his actions within section 10(b) of the
Act. 288
2. The O’Hagan Decision Failed to Articulate the Relationship
Between the Misappropriation Theory and a Fiduciary Relationship
The Court in O’Hagan was clear that it premised O’Hagan’s liability on
a breach of duty owed to his firm. 289 It held O’Hagan liable because he had
feigned fidelity to the source of the information, which constituted the
deception essential to a finding of liability under the misappropriation
theory. 290 In requiring the fiduciary relationship, the Court carried over to
the misappropriation theory the fiduciary framework that controlled liability
under the classical theory. 291 However, the O’Hagan Court failed to
articulate why liability under the misappropriation theory should be limited
to those who breach a duty to the source of the information, and failed to
state why O’Hagan’s “feigning fidelity” to his firm was essential to
satisfying the deception requirement. 292 It is uncertain why the duty to
disclose should arise from a fiduciary duty rather than from an obligation to
disclose under federal securities law.293
Requiring a breach of duty between the misappropriator and the source of
the information is unrelated to the purpose of the prohibition: to protect
investors and the integrity of the market. 294 It may be that the Court simply
endorsed the government’s articulation of the theory, which was consistent
with the facts of the case. 295 Though O’Hagan’s feigned fidelity was
deceptive, it is not clear why this should be a prerequisite for an outsider’s
liability under the misappropriation theory. 296
3. Failure to Define Liable Outsiders
After the Chiarella decision in 1980, lower courts articulated various
conceptions of the misappropriation theory, each with slightly different
287. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339. The First Circuit treated the
safe harbor provision as “arguably dicta.” SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006).
288. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339.
289. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55.
290. Id. at 655.
291. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336.
292. See id.
293. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under
Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1655–56 (2004).
294. See Krawiec, supra note 20, at 174.
295. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654, 665 n.6; see Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1638 (noting the
repeated approving references in the majority opinion to the government’s brief).
296. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1335. For example, the
misappropriation theory, as articulated by Chief Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent, is
not similarly limited. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
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standards, which resulted in vague doctrine. 297 Professor Richard Painter
and his colleagues noted that the O’Hagan Court failed to clarify
misappropriation doctrine by providing criteria by which a lower court
could distinguish between a fiduciary relationship and a non-fiduciary
relationship. 298 This vagueness is compounded by the incoherence of
requiring a fiduciary relationship between the misappropriator and the
source when the purpose is to protect the market and investors.299 Thus,
they argued after O’Hagan that lower courts will still need to engage in an
essentially ad hoc analysis whenever presented with a relationship between
the source and the misappropriator that has not been addressed in a previous
case. 300
The Court’s treatment of the fiduciary requirement in O’Hagan led some
commentators to read the decision as standing for the proposition that the
misappropriation theory does not require the breach of a fiduciary duty at
all. 301 The purpose of the misappropriation theory does not require a
fiduciary relationship. 302 As explained by Justice Blackmun in his
Chiarella dissent, the misappropriation theory is intended to apply to
anyone who misappropriates information and is not necessarily limited to
individuals with a fiduciary duty to the source. 303 Thus, reading O’Hagan
for the proposition that a fiduciary duty is not required for liability—
interpreting the decision as a broader prohibition against theft—is
consistent with the underlying purpose of the misappropriation theory.
C. A Fiduciary Requirement Results in the Misappropriation Theory
Being Under-Inclusive
Critics have posited that limiting liability under the misappropriation
theory to cases in which the trader breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of
the information is under-inclusive. 304 This result occurs because the market
and investors are harmed similarly by anyone who trades on material
nonpublic information, but only certain outsiders will be liable under the
misappropriation theory. 305 Likewise, to the extent that a company has a
property interest in its confidential business information, as the Court stated
in Carpenter, 306 that company is harmed by a misappropriator using the
information to make securities trades regardless of whether the trader was a
fiduciary of the company. 307
297. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 188.
298. Id. at 191.
299. Id. at 188.
300. See id. at 191.
301. See Steinbuch, supra note 122, at 594–96; Transcript of the Roundtable on Insider
Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory After O’Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 27 (1998)
(comment of Prof. Marcel Kahan).
302. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.
303. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 249 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. Krawiec, supra note 20, at 174.
305. See id.
306. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
307. See Davis, supra note 54, at 1482.
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D. Post-O’Hagan Treatment of the Fiduciary Requirement
In the aftermath of the O’Hagan decision, the SEC promulgated Rule
10b5-2. 308 Rule 10b5-2 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of circumstances
that give rise to a duty of “trust or confidence.” 309 The purpose of the rule
was to clarify the relationships that could give rise to a duty of trust and
confidence. 310 These circumstances include (1) any time a person agrees to
maintain information in confidence,311 (2) when parties exchange
information and a past pattern of sharing confidence exists between the
parties such that the recipient knows or should know that the person
communicating expects her to maintain the information as confidential,312
and (3) when family members exchange information and the receiving party
is unable to show that the person sharing the information did not expect that
she would keep the information confidential. 313
The relationships listed in Rule 10b5-2 have not traditionally been
An agreement to keep
considered fiduciary or fiduciary-like. 314
information confidential has not traditionally given rise to a fiduciary duty
absent something more. 315 Thus, under Rule 10b-5, a “duty of trust or
confidence” is not synonymous with a fiduciary duty. 316 One commentator
has posited that the promulgation of 10b5-2 confirms that the
misappropriation theory is “not about fiduciary relationships at all” but
rather “it is about regulating information dissemination in securities
markets, and the animating principle is one of equal access.” 317
Court decisions and SEC enforcement actions in the wake of O’Hagan
indicate that the question whether a fiduciary duty is required for liability
under the misappropriation theory remains open. As described above, the
SEC has brought enforcement actions under the misappropriation theory
against a hacker who lacked any relationship with the source of the
information, and against an individual for accessing his brother-in-law’s
computer after guessing his password. 318 In both cases, the SEC targeted
individuals who lacked any fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty to the sources of
information. 319
The Second Circuit supported this reading in Dorozhko by holding that a
fiduciary duty is not always required for a claim under section 10(b) of the

308. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2011).
309. Id.
310. See Joanna B. Apolinsky, Insider Trading as Misfeasance: The Yielding of the
Fiduciary Requirement, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 493, 519 (2011).
311. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
312. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2).
313. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3).
314. See Apolinsky, supra note 310, at 520.
315. See id. at 519–20.
316. See id.
317. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1422 (2002).
318. See supra Part I.C.3.
319. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
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Act. 320 The Second Circuit’s holding that Supreme Court precedent does
not require a fiduciary duty in all section 10(b) cases is not universally
accepted. For example, the district court in Dorozhko had held that a
fiduciary duty was required. 321 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held in Regents
of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.322
that a breach of candid disclosure is an essential element of a deceptive
device under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. A number of scholars have
likewise argued that a fiduciary duty is a requirement for any violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and have criticized the Dorozhko decision for
its departure from that requirement.323 Nevertheless, the SEC appears, by
virtue of its recent enforcement actions, and Rule 10b5-2’s promulgation, to
be pushing its position that a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation need
not occur only when there is a breach of a fiduciary duty and, at least in
Dorozhko, the Second Circuit agreed. 324
E. The Duty Not to Steal
Though the debate remains open, if the SEC and Second Circuit are
correct, and a fiduciary duty is not a requirement for all section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 violations, an important limitation on outsider trading liability
will be removed. This would, in turn, suggest that the alternative reading of
O’Hagan—that he violated a duty not to steal confidential information and
was liable for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 regardless of his
relationship with his firm—is correct. 325 This reading places emphasis on
the acquisition and dissemination of the information into the market.
III. THEFT BY AN OUTSIDER IS SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER
OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
The question remains open whether a theft of information is sufficient to
trigger a duty for an outsider to disclose or abstain from trading. 326 Some
scholars have read the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan as not
requiring a fiduciary relationship for misappropriation theory liability.327
320. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2009).
321. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated by Dorozhko,
574 F.3d 42.
322. 482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
323. See, e.g., Matthew T.M. Feeks, Turned Inside-Out: The Development of “Outsider
Trading” and How Dorozhko May Expand the Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 7 J.L.
ECON & POL’Y 61, 83–85 (2010); Elizabeth A. Odian, Note, SEC v. Dorozhko’s Affirmative
Misrepresentation Theory of Insider Trading: An Improper Means to a Proper End, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 1313, 1328–29, 1331–33 (2011); Stephen Bainbridge, The Second Circuit’s
Egregious Decision in SEC v. Dorozhko, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 29, 2009, 4:36
AM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/07/the-secondcircuits-recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with-one-of-the-questionsleft-open-by-the.html.
324. See Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48; Apolinsky, supra note 312, at 521.
325. See supra Part II.B.2.
326. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
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Under this reading, the Court articulated a duty not to steal material
nonpublic information, rather than a duty not to misappropriate information
only in the presence of a fiduciary duty owed by the misappropriator to the
source of the information. 328 Until courts have the opportunity to weigh in
definitively on a case that presents the issue squarely, or Congress produces
clear guidance on the issue, the answer will remain uncertain.
Part III of this Note asserts that all thieves of material nonpublic
information should be held liable under the misappropriation theory in light
of Supreme Court precedent, recent case law, and public policy consistent
with the purpose of the Act. Part III.A reviews Supreme Court precedent
related to insider and outsider trading and argues that extension of liability
to outsiders is consistent with the Court’s treatment of insider and outsider
trading doctrine. Part III.B addresses the affirmative misrepresentation
theory of outsider trading liability accepted by the Second Circuit in
Dorozhko, and concludes that the framework is under-inclusive. Part III.C
argues that holding all thieves liable for outsider trading is consistent with
both the purpose and letter of the Act and with Supreme Court case law.
Finally, Part III.D argues the Court should adopt a broader conception of
the misappropriation theory, consistent with that articulated by Chief
Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent.
A. Extension of Liability to Outsiders
1. Holding Outsiders Liable Is a Natural Extension of Case Law
The history of judicial decisions related to insider and outsider trading
liability reveals a clear trend of courts increasing the scope of liability over
time. 329 Under Texas Gulf Sulphur, all insiders trading on confidential
information were liable for insider trading under the parity of information
theory. 330 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of liability
articulated by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur by requiring a
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence to exist between the
trading parties to give rise to insider trading liability. 331 However, after the
step back in Chiarella, the Court again expanded liability in Dirks by
holding that tippees could be held liable for insider trading through the
tipper’s fiduciary relationship to stockholders, even if the tippee did not
have a fiduciary or similar relationship to the stockholders.332 Finally, in
O’Hagan, the Court accepted the misappropriation theory, holding that
even as an outsider, O’Hagan could be liable for trading on material
nonpublic information, though the Court limited liability to outsiders who
have a duty to the source of the information.333
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.C.
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The trend of increasing liability for insider and outsider trading indicated
in the case history suggests that the courts have not yet defined conclusively
the bounds of liability. The Court has proven flexible in its decisions in
order to address new behavior as it has been presented. This is in part
because of the unclear theoretical underpinnings of insider trading
doctrine, 334 but it is also consistent with the tradition of courts interpreting
the securities laws flexibly rather than narrowly or technically in order to
serve their broad purpose. 335 Should the Court be presented with the
question of liability for a thief under the misappropriation theory, the
Court’s prior decisions are unlikely to limit its expansion of the doctrine.
Holding all thieves liable is a logical extension of existing section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 doctrine as courts have developed it in the cases above.
Through those decisions, the Court has extended liability from insiders, to
outsiders who receive tips from insiders, to outsiders who owe a duty to the
source of the information. The extension of liability to thieves will require
the Court to disclaim a fiduciary duty as a prerequisite in all insider and
outsider trading cases, as the Second Circuit held in Dorozhko. 336
It is uncertain whether a fiduciary duty is required in all section 10(b)
cases. 337 Recent cases, beginning with O’Hagan, and SEC enforcement
actions indicate that the fiduciary requirement is no longer a prerequisite for
outsider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 338 The
fiduciary requirement had served a sorting function for insider trading
cases, separating those with a fiduciary or like relationship who could be
held liable for insider trading from those without such a relationship who
could not. If scholars are correct, and the misappropriation theory under
O’Hagan does not require a fiduciary relationship but simply prohibits theft
of material nonpublic information, then thieves are liable under the
misappropriation theory.
Regardless of the current state of the fiduciary requirement in section
10(b) cases, a strong argument exists that liability for outsider trading
should not be premised on a fiduciary duty between the thief and the source
of the information. As noted above, scholars criticized O’Hagan for
premising O’Hagan’s liability on his fiduciary relationship to the source of
the information. 339 Even if O’Hagan should be read for the proposition
that the misappropriation theory requires the breach of a fiduciary duty to
the source of the information in all cases, the Court should do away with the
fiduciary requirement because it is unrelated to the harm of theft which the
misappropriation theory addresses.
Theft by a fiduciary and theft by a non-fiduciary are both undesirable and
worthy of punishment, although for different reasons. Some have argued
that a theft by a fiduciary is worse than theft by a non-fiduciary because the
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
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fiduciary violates a trust, whereas a non-fiduciary thief does not. 340 Other
commentators have argued that theft by a non-fiduciary is worse because
the non-fiduciary thief both gains and uses information unlawfully, whereas
the fiduciary thief gains the information lawfully but then uses it
unlawfully. 341 Companies entrust material nonpublic information to
fiduciaries in order to function. The ability of fiduciaries to abuse their
position therefore makes strong enforcement desirable. On the other hand,
theft by a non-fiduciary can be accomplished easily in many cases and the
effects of such thefts can be serious and difficult to detect.342 This suggests
that a non-deceptive theft should be punished strongly in order to deter
others from engaging in theft of confidential information. The ability of the
SEC to obtain treble damages under securities laws has the potential to act
as a strong deterrent. 343
2. Limiting Harm from Theft by Outsiders
The purpose of the misappropriation theory, as stated by Justice
Blackmun, is to protect against theft and improper use of material
nonpublic information, not to deter a specific instance of a fiduciary
violation. 344 In turn, this goal is consistent with the broad goal of the Act to
protect investors and the integrity of the markets. 345 Should the Court
accept a broader conception of the misappropriation theory that does not
rely on a fiduciary relationship, then the goal of the doctrine should be to
limit, to the extent possible, the harm to markets, investors, and companies
caused by outsiders who steal and trade on material nonpublic information.
The purpose of the misappropriation theory and the goal of limiting harm
caused by theft can be achieved only incompletely by limiting liability
under the misappropriation theory to those who stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the source of the information, because most thieves will not
be in such a relation to the source of the information. Thus, a broader scope
of liability will better achieve the purpose of limiting the harm from theft.
B. The Second Circuit’s Deceptive, Non-deceptive Framework
1. Deceptive Thieves Are Liable
The Second Circuit’s decision in Dorozhko represents an important step
toward broadening the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to
capture a wider range of outsiders and to limit the harm caused by theft.346
The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the necessity of a fiduciary

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 1991).
See Steinbuch, supra note 122, at 592.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 507.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.3.b.

2194

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

requirement in all section 10(b) cases. 347 By accepting the theory of
affirmative misrepresentation in Dorozhko, the court appeared to recognize
the harm caused by trading on misappropriated material nonpublic
information, even when the misappropriator is a thief without a fiduciary
relationship to the source of the information.348
2. The Deceptive, Non-deceptive Framework Is Under-Inclusive
Notwithstanding this important step, the deceptive, non-deceptive
framework is not a fully satisfactory extension of liability to outsiders. The
framework results in liability turning on a technical distinction that will be
uncertain in many cases, and fails to sufficiently limit the harm caused by
theft of information by outsiders.
a. The Difficulty Distinguishing Deceptive and Non-deceptive Theft
In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit extended liability under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for outsider trading to non-fiduciary thieves. 349 It did so by
holding that a deceptive theft could lead to liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 350 However, the court remanded the case for determination
whether the hack was deceptive because it was accomplished by means of
an affirmative misrepresentation, or whether it was “mere theft.”351
Although the court’s analysis indicated that deceptive conduct is sufficient
for liability under section 10(b), it did not reach the question whether
Dorozhko would have been liable should the district court have determined
that the hack was not deceptive under section 10b and Rule 10b-5.
In practice, distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive thefts
can be difficult. 352 For example, an outsider could commit a deceptive theft
by disguising herself in order to gain access to an office and then stealing
material nonpublic information from a company once inside. This
individual’s conduct is analytically similar to the deceptive hacker who
affirmatively misrepresents her identity in order to gain access to a
computer system. 353 However, an outsider could also be in a company’s
office for a legitimate purpose and steal information while there. Such an
individual does not accomplish the theft of information by means of an
affirmative misrepresentation. The individual is similar to the nondeceptive hacker who exploits a vulnerability or loophole in computer code
to gain access to the company’s computer system and steal information.354
The first individual has engaged in affirmative misrepresentation, whereas

347.
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352.
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354.
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the second has not, as the distinction is made in Dorozhko.355 The first is
liable under section 10(b) under the Second Circuit’s analysis in Dorozhko,
whereas the second individual is not. 356
Though the example above serves to make clear the distinction between
deceptive and non-deceptive theft, the facts of Dorozhko demonstrate how
difficult the distinction can be to make in practice.357 Dorozhko turned on a
technical distinction, and imposing liability for securities fraud on the
distinction is uncertain.
The distinction between deceptive and non-deceptive theft may implicate
the steps that the company will take following the theft. For example, a
non-deceptive theft such as the exploitation of faulty code by an anonymous
hacker may have the positive result of providing an incentive to close such
security loopholes. In either case, however, the result is the violation of the
company’s property right in its confidential information and harm to
investors and the market. Therefore, it is desirable that both types of theft
be punished.
b. Distinguishing Deceptive and Non-deceptive Theft Is Inconsistent
with the Act and Case Law
The broad purposes of the Act are to ensure the integrity of the securities
The deceptive, non-deceptive
markets and to protect investors.358
framework is problematic not only because the distinction between the two
is difficult to make but also because the non-deceptive thief may not be
liable; the framework is potentially under-inclusive and therefore fails to
advance the purpose of the Act satisfactorily. As indicated in the Second
Circuit’s decision, a thief may be able to escape liability depending on a
technical determination of the manner by which she gained access to the
confidential information. 359
It is an anomalous result that a thief should be able to shield herself from
liability to the SEC or receive a lesser punishment based on the means by
which she accomplished her theft. In either case the harm is the same to the
thief’s trading partners, the market, and the source of the information.360
Having liability turn on the distinction appears to be in conflict with goal of
flexible interpretation of securities laws.361 Premising liability on a
technical consideration is likely to result in unsatisfactory results and future
expansion of doctrine, as courts recognize other situations in which it is
desirable and consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act to hold a
thief liable.
355. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Part I.A.1.
359. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
360. See Michael D. Wheatley, Apologia for the Second Circuit’s Opinion in SEC v.
Dorozhko, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 51 (2010).
361. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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C. Holding Non-deceptive Thieves Liable for Outsider Trading Is
Consistent with the Act and Current Case Law
Policy favors holding all thieves liable for stealing and trading using
material nonpublic information. To restrict theft to cases accomplished by
means of deception is to engage in line-drawing that results in underinclusive doctrine. This section argues that holding all thieves liable for
outsider trading is consistent with the Act.
As discussed above, trading by corporate outsiders presents different
problems and creates greater externalities than insider trading. 362 Thus, as
Stephens and Choi argued, the case for regulating outsider trading is
stronger than the case for regulating insider trading. 363 Given the
aggressive stance taken by regulators with respect to insider trading and the
potential for greater harm by outsiders, outsider trading is likely underregulated in comparison with insider trading with respect to the goal of
protecting markets and investors.
Permitting the use of stolen information undermines the integrity of the
securities markets and investors’ confidence. The hypothetical described
above 364 distinguished between deceptive and non-deceptive thieves, but
ultimately it is beneficial to investors, the markets, and the source of the
information to hold both individuals liable.
As noted above, theft of information by hackers is a growing concern to
regulators. 365 The facts of Dorozhko demonstrate the harm caused by such
thieves who trade on material nonpublic information.
By using
misappropriated information obtained by hacking the server, Dorozhko was
able to trade with unwitting market participants using an unfair
advantage. 366 A trading partner is harmed similarly in this instance as in
the instance of a corporate insider trading using material nonpublic
information; in either case, she is trading at an informational disadvantage
to the misappropriator. Regardless of the means by which Dorozhko
accomplished the theft, it is consistent with the Act to hold him liable.
In Carpenter, the Court recognized that a company has a property
interest in its confidential business information.367 A thief violates this
property right by wrongfully taking possession of the company’s
confidential information in order to trade. Again, regardless of whether the
theft was deceptive or non-deceptive, the harm is similar and it is consistent
with the Act to hold the thief liable in either case.
In the absence of the breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the
information and in the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation, the
actions of a thief nevertheless fit within the existing framework of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability. Rule 10b5-2 provides “a non-exclusive
362.
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definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or
confidence for purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory.” 368 As noted
above, the Rule indicates that the misappropriation theory is not concerned
with fiduciary relationships so much as with regulating the flow of
information in securities markets. 369 Theft of information used for
securities trading, regardless of the circumstances by which the theft is
accomplished, implicates this concern because the thief gains an unfair
informational advantage over her trading partners.
D. Chief Justice Burger’s Dissenting Opinion in Chiarella Provides a
Broader Construction of the Misappropriation Theory
The view of the misappropriation theory articulated by Chief Justice
Burger in his Chiarella dissent provides a model for the broader view of the
misappropriation theory that courts should adopt. 370 The purpose of the
misappropriation theory, as articulated by Chief Justice Burger, is
preventing trading on misappropriated information when the
misappropriator gains the information by unlawful means, regardless of any
relationship with the source. 371 Under this view, the misappropriation
theory imposes a general duty to disclose or abstain on any thief.372 This
prohibition fits within the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which
reach “any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme.” 373 This conception
of the misappropriation theory has the practical benefit of capturing thieves
who are neither fiduciaries, nor engage in affirmative misrepresentation to
accomplish their thefts, and therefore does away with two criteria that serve
to make the misappropriation theory under-inclusive.
Chief Justice Burger’s view of the misappropriation theory is broad
enough to capture all undesirable conduct, including theft of material
nonpublic information, without unduly chilling legitimate research.
However, the broader liability will not go so far as to usher in a return of
the equal access theory that was rejected in Chiarella. 374 The duty to
disclose or abstain would arise from the unlawful acquisition of the
information, not simply the possession of information unknown to the
market and other investors. Premising the duty to disclose or abstain on the
theft of information would merely prevent thieves from using information
that others cannot gain by lawful means.375
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CONCLUSION
Over time, the Court has expanded liability for trading on material
nonpublic information from corporate insiders only, to tippees, to outsiders
such as O’Hagan, standing in a fiduciary relationship to the source of the
confidential information. Holding thieves liable for insider trading is the
next logical step in the development of the misappropriation theory of
liability under section 10(b). The purpose of section 10(b) of the Act and
Rule 10b-5 is to ensure the integrity of the securities markets and fairness to
investors. Holding thieves liable, as Dorozhko clearly demonstrates, is
necessary to achieve that goal, but requiring a fiduciary relationship
between the thief and the source of the information is inconsistent with this
purpose and results in under-inclusive doctrine. Thus, the Court should
adopt Chief Justice Burger’s view of the misappropriation theory articulated
in his Chiarella dissent, under which the duty to disclose or abstain from
trading extends to all those who steal confidential information.

